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• #grapheneos
• 21:10
  TheJollyRoger
  yzrhjocizuwkjlqo: you're close. If I recall right there are other secret parts of information that the Titan uses (I'm not sure of all of them) for key derivation but you're correct that the Titan is capable of bolstering the strength of a short pin. With respect to phones without a security chip, it tends to vary depending on the phone's CPU and the OEM's attentiveness to security.
• 21:14
  yzrhjocizuwkjlqo
  <TheJollyRoger "yzrhjocizuwkjlqocf: you're close"> Titan M is close to Apples Secure Enclave, right? How can Cellebrite then brute force an iPhones standard 6 pin in a couple of hours/days if the secure chip should stop that? I'm talking about Apples security chip here, as that's the only info we got about adversaries with lots of money trying to get into phones.
• 21:15
  TheJollyRoger
  The Titan M is very different than Apple's Secure Enclave Processor; if I recall right what they were doing to brute force the SEP was they were spoofing the time. The Titan M contains its own timer, for this reason.

• #grapheneos
• 10:10
  anupritaisno1[m]
  mistazaki: try Titan M attestation
• 10:12
  mistazaki[m]
  <anupritaisno1[m] "mistazaki: try Titan M attestati"> How?
• 10:45
  Dylanger[m]
  Because it's an EVT, you might even have a dev version of Titan M potentially

• #grapheneos
• 20:32
  TheJollyRoger
  ultracard[m]: oh yeah. You asked about the Titan security chip a bit back, did you? I've got a bit of a moment now to discuss it.

• #grapheneos
• 17:01
  strcat[m]
  or just use a random PIN (8 digit or so) without biometric unlock if you want to rely on the Titan M for security instead of your passphrase

• #grapheneos
• 14:37
  lolly
  But could government and police parties have backdoors into the titan M chip?
• 15:34
  anupritaisno1[m]
  lolly when you press wipe the decryption key is wiped from the titan M
• 17:02
  strcat[m]
  anupritaisno1: the decryption key isn't on the Titan M, it's not stored anywhere
• 17:03
  strcat[m]
  without one, you depend on the hardware-based security features, such as if you have a 6 digit PIN, you're depending on the Titan M throttling
• 20:46
  strcat[m]
  if someone uses a 6 digit PIN, then they depend on the security of the Titan M

• #grapheneos
• 17:12
  anupritaisno1[m]
  Titan M
• 17:13
  Remu[m]
  Just curious, so I assume any Pixel with Titan M will support it when they will get Auditor support?

• #grapheneos
• 19:41
  strcat[m]
  there is a far superior security chip built into the phone (Titan M) along with a secure element on the SoC (SPU)

• #grapheneos
• 17:09
  incognitopeople
  features. We're also working together with Incognito and theirs developers and we want to find a way to integrate a Cold wallet for incognito chain with titan-M chip. As we know, company like Omerta used and sell smartphone with you OS. We would like to do similar but before that, we would like to make a partnership and work together with you to

• #grapheneos
• 21:41
  alex-resist_
  It said "Wiping Titan M" and then "Can't send spi message: Try again" about 25 times. In the end it still said "Data wipe complete"

• #grapheneos
• 09:33
  Dylanger[m]
  Does the 4a have the Titan M?
• 11:42
  strcat[m]
  Dylanger: it's not a general purpose SoC, it's a secure element like the Titan M
• 11:59
  Dylanger[m]
  <strcat[m] "> works differently"> I know that these 2 things are totally seperate, the shell I was dropped into was some sort of UART terminal, the cable itself added resistance to D- line, muxing me to the Titan M, I only mentioned adb was disabled because I was able to take his _totally untouced Pixel 3, and interact with the (debatable) most IC of the device_
• 12:00
  Dylanger[m]
  * I know that these 2 things are totally seperate, the shell I was dropped into was some sort of UART terminal, the cable itself added resistance to D- line, muxing me to the Titan M, I only mentioned adb was disabled because I was able to take his _totally untouced Pixel 3, and interact with the (debatable) most important/private IC in the device_
• 12:01
  strcat[m]
  you can't "interact" with the Titan M using it
• 12:02
  strcat[m]
  and you also seem confused about what the Titan M provides
• 21:44
  Dylanger[m]
  Has anyone done any side channel fun with Titan M?

• #grapheneos
• 13:41
  Resynth[m]
  Graphene works fine with Titan M
• 13:41
  Resynth[m]
  I still think Titan M is shit, but it exists on GrapheneOS
• 13:42
  Resynth[m]
  androidauthority.com/titan-m-security-chip-915888
• 15:00
  strcat[m]
  the Titan M has dedicated hardware entropy generation + CSPRNG, so that's what's used internally for the StrongBox keystore
• 15:00
  strcat[m]
  Titan M random number generation is just for StrongBox

• #grapheneos
• 21:29
  blacklight447[m]
  <anupritaisno1[m] "It is very hard to brute force e"> As long as they do not beat the titan M right?
• 22:43
  anupritaisno1[m]
  BTW did your titan m throw some weird errors?

• #grapheneos
• 04:13
  strcat[m]
  the Titan M is the main place that a custom AVB key is stored along with vbmeta rollback indices
• 17:14
  jpds
  esmspwdcesmrcbtt: Yes, through the use of Titan M

• #grapheneos
• 11:19
  renlord
  when you say titan m is broken, what sort of symptoms are we looking at?
• 18:54
  engulf[m]
  Titan M is open source but its near to impossible to verify that its running the code
• 18:56
  JTL
  > 11:54 <engulf[m]> Titan M is open source but its near to impossible to verify that its running the code
• 19:10
  strcat[m]
  BalooRJ: so for example the Titan M just provides specific features, it doesn't have any control beyond implementing the APIs it is supposed to implement

• #grapheneos
• 18:58
  strcat[m]
  with Titan M
• 19:06
  strcat[m]
  this seems like an Android 11 Titan M bug
• 19:09
  strcat[m]
  seems Titan M is not getting time synced to it properly
• 19:09
  strcat[m]
  seems like a Titan M bug

• #grapheneos
• 17:55
  res4[m]
  <louipc "need tshirts and stickers and al"> Or package actual jazz with every install of GrapheneOS. Randomly generated with encryption keys stored in the Titan M chip, so no one but you will get to listen to your sweet, sweet personal privacy-jazz.

• #grapheneos
• 17:07
  anupritaisno1[m]
  Google might tie it with the titan M
• 17:08
  strcat[m]
  Titan M doesn't have an API for that stuff just the regular keystore API
• 18:11
  anupritaisno1[m]
  [strcat](matrix.to/#/@strcat:matrix.org): then should this password be backed on titan m or no?

• #grapheneos
• 14:38
  strcat[m]
  on a Pixel the Titan M provides the API for this

• #grapheneos
• 10:32
  cn3m[m]
  it takes 650 years to break a Titan M with a 4 digit random PIN
• 10:35
  cn3m[m]
  and of course that primary unlock method is super strong since the Titan M
• 10:35
  strcat[m]
  it's super strong if you use a strong passphrase regardless since it uses scrypt combined with hardware-accelerated, hardware-bound encryption with the Titan M protection added on top of that
• 10:36
  strcat[m]
  the Titan M protection added on top is what makes it so that even a 6 digit PIN will take a ridiculous amount of time to brute force unless they can exploit the tiny attack surface of the Titan M
• 10:40
  strcat[m]
  and if the Titan M is not exploited successfully, then even a crappy PIN unlock lasts that long
• 10:41
  strcat[m]
  and Titan M firmware cannot be updated until authentication of the owner account is done successfully so you'd actually need to exploit it, can't do something like bribing insiders millions to steal the keys to sign firmware

• #grapheneos
• 21:29
  cn3m[m]
  <bypassbob[m] "Is that the facial recognition? "> it is a fuzzed mathmatical representation stored in the Titan M

• #grapheneos
• 19:21
  jpds
  lev[m]: The biometric data is stored in the Titan M security chip

• #grapheneos
• 14:40
  jacktheclipper[m
  Titan M is the full name. Basically it is a separate chip that stores the encryption key for the phone. This article explains it better than I can: wired.com/story/google-titan-m-security-chip-pixel-3
• 14:42
  jacktheclipper[m
  When you change your screen PIN or pattern, the actual encryption keys do not change (re-encypting the phone would take a long time) but because it is really hard to access the tiny Titan M chip the encryption keys are still safe.

• #grapheneos
• 18:43
  cn3m[m]
  <tinkerthinker "? reboot disables biometrics? Ho"> Before first unlock no keys are stored in the system only in the Titan M
• 18:46
  cn3m[m]
  due to Titan M insider attack resistance

• #grapheneos
• 06:31
  cn3m[m]
  Titan M enforces the boot integrity. Google offers $1,000,000 in bounty for persistent attacks against it.
• 06:33
  Vappy[m]
  <cn3m[m] "Titan M enforces the boot integr"> Titan M chip makes sure you cant flash a modded bl right
• 06:34
  cn3m[m]
  <Vappy[m] "Titan M chip makes sure you cant"> Yes(ish) standard feature with the Qualcomm TEE on Android
• 06:35
  cn3m[m]
  Titan M expands and strengthens the stock Android security features
• 06:37
  cn3m[m]
  Titan M also enforces user consent for firmware upgrades
• 06:42
  cn3m[m]
  Pixel has none of these issues and pushes it further. The Titan M security chip can't load firmware without user permission so even with Google and GrapheneOS fully cooperating with whoever wants to break into a seized phone they would be sore out of luck.
• 06:52
  Vappy[m]
  This makes me wonder, is the Titan M googles implementation of the security enclave on iPhones? Better or worse?
• 06:52
  Vappy[m]
  you're making the Titan M sound like an indestructible shield and im a bit skeptical, although I dont know too much about it
• 06:53
  cn3m[m]
  Vappy: The Secure Enclave has a very strong track record and is over 7 years old and very well documented. It is probably to early to compare the Titan M definitively. Though the Titan M matches it on feature set and has had no issues so far
• 06:54
  cn3m[m]
  You will not lose anything to my knowledge using the Titan M instead
• 06:54
  Vappy[m]
  1 mill to any bugs found on the Titan M chip

• #grapheneos
• 06:36
  niky
  but if im buy an android device it will be a pixel coz of titan m and updates

• #grapheneos
• 20:54
  blueuser[m]
  it's hardcoded in source but maybe it's different for pixels with titan m idk

• #grapheneos
• 14:22
  za_vilfp8kn0pcyh
  Besides, the encryption keys on Titan M would be wiped anyways if you do so
• 14:45
  Autopsy[m]
  <sinenomine[m] "Okay but does the delete option "> Set up a strong password and biometrics. If someone has access to your phone, they won't be able to recover anything without that. The Titan M chip will do its job to ensure no unauthorised access is done.
• 14:49
  derpy
  Think the Titan M is backdoored?

• #grapheneos
• 19:04
  nikitalita[m]
  is there a decent whitepaper on how the Titan M works? I'm not able to turn up much besides the google blog post announcing it

• #grapheneos
• 13:15
  cn3m[m]
  The Titan M does the same thing

• #grapheneos
• 01:12
  cn3m[m]
  the hardware rate limiter in the Titan M means a 4 Digit PIN should be safe for 650 years
• 01:16
  cn3m[m]
  a hardware rate limiter bypass is extremely unlikely. The SEP has gone undefeated for 7 years. No firmware decryption and partial compromises don't count. The Titan M will hold on

• #grapheneos
• 21:56
  SchismXL[m]
  kejsixi reddit.com/r/GrapheneOS/comments/hf…_chip_actually_do/fw8kr29?context=3 check this comment and read through the info.
• 22:11
  kejsixi[m]
  SchismXL: thank you! I have read all of what's linked in the reddit post yesterday, but not security.googleblog.com/2018/10/bui…-titan-better-security-through.html They write ...Titan M performs several security sensitive functions, including:
• 22:17
  SchismXL[m]
  <kejsixi[m] "hm. which would be stored on the"> Someone else may be along later today or tomorrow to answer these in more detail, of they have time. But yeah, biometrics and such will be on the Titan M chip.
• 22:58
  bocyemofo[m]
  <kejsixi[m] "i asumed youre thinking economy "> In this case data = money. A Titan backdoor would only provide data on Pixel phones (Android as a whole is much larger, of course), and would also not provide any extra data except in the (incredibly rare) case of a de-googled custom ROM.
• 22:58
  Antoine-Frdric[m
  Maybe there's a backdoor into Titan M, maybe not. Anyway, you're not worth a zero-day.
• 23:11
  camoufrage[m]
  <kejsixi[m] "yes sounds like an IME/VPRO to m"> Google does not sell nearly enough pixels to do this. Especially since Titan is based on their own security measures on the Titan

• #grapheneos
• 00:03
  cn3m[m]
  3. Titan M doesn't have networking and has to pass CTS(open source) as matching the encryption output
• 00:04
  cn3m[m]
  Those 3 reasons is why it is essentially impossible for the Titan M to be backdoored. Otherwise it would be noticed in testing. Google won't take a risk. They will pay a million per exploit against it and fix it
• 00:10
  cn3m[m]
  <plain_dust[m] "why isn't the titan chip open so"> I don't know it is something they are planning and they are building an open hardware option too
• 08:00
  SchismXL[m]
  That Pixel 4a leak looks quite nice. 6gb RAM, 128gb storage, Snapdragon 730G, 5.81 inch hole punch, FHD+ HDR, 3140mAh battery, 12.2MP rear, 8MP front, headphone jack (apparently), Titan M Chip... For $349.

• #grapheneos
• 10:31
  anonhat[m]
  <anupritaisno1[m] "Google has made a requirement in"> But the Titan M chip is still a black box.
• 10:31
  anupritaisno1[m]
  anonhat: it doesn't matter because they have to proof that encryption in SW and from the titan M is exactly the same
• 10:32
  anupritaisno1[m]
  * anonhat: it doesn't matter because they have to prove that encryption in SW and from the titan M is exactly the same
• 10:32
  cn3m[m]
  Titan M should be the least of your worries
• 10:34
  cn3m[m]
  <cn3m[m] "it also has insider attack resis"> the Titan M is extremely hard for Google to backdoor for the government(a
• 10:35
  cn3m[m]
  Titan M should hold, but no guarantees of course
• 10:39
  cn3m[m]
  SEP is using it I would bet $50 Titan M is too
• 10:54
  anupritaisno1[m]
  If there was a titan M and full verified boot on desktop it'd be great
• 10:54
  cn3m[m]
  <anupritaisno1[m] "If there was a titan M and full "> Apple Silicon
• 10:55
  EssentialChaos[m
  <anupritaisno1[m] "If there was a titan M and full "> At least you have a secure phone

• #grapheneos
• 04:22
  cn3m[m]
  <Knull[m] "The subpoenas. Id rather my devi"> it is stored fuzzed in the Titan or SEP
• 04:25
  cn3m[m]
  <switchdominion[m "cn3m: "> reddit.com/r/GrapheneOS/comments/hf…he_titan_m_chip_actually_do/fw8kr29 this is all I found
• 04:29
  switchdominion[m
  <cn3m[m] "reddit.com/r/Graphen"> I read a bit of that earlier and I'll take a closer look now. Mostly I was wondering what you meant by Face ID and/or biometrics being "stored fuzzed in the Titan or SEP."
• 04:51
  switchdominion[m
  <cn3m[m] "650 years, though there could al"> Specifically, I'm referring to brute forcing a pin with a Titan M. What flaw might you be referring to?
• 04:54
  switchdominion[m
  <cn3m[m] "It is not outside the realm of p"> Of course. That is probably why Google has a $1.5 million bounty for anyone that can find a bug in the Titan M.
• 04:58
  switchdominion[m
  theverge.com/2019/11/21/20975650/go…chip-bug-bounty-program-3-3a-4-hack

• #grapheneos
• 09:37
  cn3m[m]
  <Jimmehh[m] "cn3m: no there is one from like "> right same goes for Titan M or anything
• 09:39
  Jimmehh[m]
  <cn3m[m] "right same goes for Titan M or a"> titan m hasn't had any public vulnerabilities to my knowledge yet
• 09:41
  cn3m[m]
  the SEP and Titan M are both great either could fall but probably won't. Outside of 99% of people's threat models

• #grapheneos
• 18:11
  theultron[m]
  I think the Pixel have something called Titan M which makes brute forcing difficult. You still may go with a longer password to be on the safer side.
• 18:13
  lovesausage[m]
  ah , I never understood what the titan M did really
• 18:13
  cn3m[m]
  The Titan M is extremely close to the Secure Enclave from Apple which has still secure after 7 years
• 18:13
  cn3m[m]
  The Titan M and Secure Enclave both offer Insider Attack Resistance and rollback protection
• 18:13
  rover1[m]
  <cn3m[m] "The Titan M and Secure Enclave b"> researchers made work on sep, see Hao Xu abstract mosec.org/en/2020
• 18:21
  anupritaisno1[m]
  cn3m: apart from the 1M bounty are you describing Qualcomm TEE or Titan M because Qualcomm TEE does that as well
• 18:21
  anupritaisno1[m]
  There are other reasons for the titan M to be used
• 19:12
  TheJollyRoger
  No, you can't. The Titan M contains an access token and its own internal incremental timer that doesn't answer to the host timer.
• 19:13
  TheJollyRoger
  So even if you found an exploit for the operating system, the Titan M is going to say "Sorry, but your timer doesn't match mine. Fifty seconds, by MY COUNT, and not yours."
• 19:24
  cn3m[m]
  the iPhone has key derivation of ~150ms with dedicated crypto hardware. The Titan M must be similar that is impressive
• 19:32
  cn3m[m]
  there is really no better option(maybe marginally the secure enclave), but overall Titan M is basically our best option

• #grapheneos
• 13:56
  strcat[m]
  like it's totally possible the beta had screwed up Titan M firmware and triggered some tamper thing
• 13:58
  strcat[m]
  if they had a serial debug cable they could get Titan M logs (there's a way to get them)
• 13:58
  blacklight447[m]
  <strcat[m] "like it's totally possible the b"> Does flashing the os on your storage alter the titan firmware..?
• 13:59
  strcat[m]
  Titan M firmware is uploaded by the OS
• 14:03
  anupritaisno1[m]
  strcat: how to see titan M logs?
• 14:06
  anupritaisno1[m]
  strcat: does fastboot -w wipe titan M like recovery?
• 15:46
  strcat[m]
  StrongBox (i.e. secure element, which is the Titan M on a Pixel) does not
• 15:47
  strcat[m]
  on Pixels StrongBox is provided by the Titan M
• 16:20
  strcat[m]
  it seems like his Titan M is broken
• 16:20
  strcat[m]
  afaik it's the OS that updates the firmware on the Titan M anyway
• 16:21
  strcat[m]
  but it seems like his Titan M has broken firmware

• #grapheneos
• 02:46
  nickcalyx[m]
  strcat would know the specifics but I think there were improvements in the titan M in between 3 and 4 ?
• 03:15
  nickcalyx[m]
  There is something about,the Titan m chip increasing the delay in between attempts, the more you try
• 03:17
  jknsec[m]
  The irony is that this is why the Titan M exists and why Graphene likes Pixels

• #grapheneos
• 06:02
  strcat[m]
  cn3m: also original pixels didn't have Titan M or Android Verified Boot 2.0

• #grapheneos
• 10:00
  cyredanthem[m]1
  > The Titan M is closed source right?

• #grapheneos
• 23:09
  strcat[m]
  Pixels have the Titan M paired with the TEE for this
• 23:09
  strcat[m]
  and store the custom key in the Titan M

• #grapheneos
• 20:30
  cn3m[m]
  skwisgaar: the Titan M is only directly linked to the home button and SOC iirc
• 20:32
  skwisgaar[m]
  <cn3m[m] "skwisgaar: the Titan M is only d"> Interesting, maybe google will end up allowing the Titan to perform more checks like that
• 20:32
  cn3m[m]
  <skwisgaar[m] "Interesting, maybe google will e"> ideally the Titan M would be connected to the display so it could set prompts
• 20:33
  cn3m[m]
  a green light comes up when the Titan M is in control
• 20:33
  cn3m[m]
  SEP and Titan M are definitely leading here, but the Titan M is very new don't count it out yet
• 20:34
  skwisgaar[m]
  The Titan M is maybe the most fascinating part of the pixel to me
• 20:37
  TheJollyRoger
  If I recall correctly, the Titan M has a physical trace to at least one of the buttons on your cellphone, which I think is pretty awesome. No way to spoof user input without someone actually pressing the button.
• 20:38
  cn3m[m]
  I can do a fake Titan M prompt and get you to click the button to do what I want
• 20:38
  cn3m[m]
  the Titan M has no way to verify that the prompt the user sees is from it
• 20:41
  cn3m[m]
  TheJollyRoger: no there is no reason the Titan M can't control the display

• #grapheneos
• 03:40
  marquisderad[m]
  One more thing also, if manufacturing a device with the idea of porting GrapheneOS or having it manufactured with security in mind, would a micro sd hardware security module be a suitable replacement for something like the Titan M?

• #grapheneos
• 16:12
  privacy_based_li
  <Cyrinux[m] "Hi, maybe im late, what think ab"> strcat: this would affect pixel too right? Maybe they will backdoor the Titan chip?

• #grapheneos
• 04:51
  Arhu
  I wonder if it would be possible to make a Pixel clone if Google finally open sources the Titan M - you could have a device with different screen size and battery, SD card support, but the same wifi chipset etc so that AOSP will run on it with minimal modification
• 05:05
  Arhu
  Still from all the manufacturers I have the highest hopes for Sony - maybe maybe if Google open sources the Titan M they'll implement it and release a goog candidate phone for GrapheneOS

• #grapheneos
• 09:50
  cn3m[m]
  The keys for the profiles are stored encrypted on the Titan M. It encrypts that generated key with your profile passcode. The OS never knows your password(and the Titan M doesn't store it)
• 22:18
  TheJollyRoger
  I wonder if they're going to use the same Titan M chip?

• #grapheneos
• 19:42
  cn3m[m]
  The Titan M will rate limit attempts

• #grapheneos
• 07:05
  jcpicard32[m]
  Obviously much smaller with things like Titan M

• #grapheneos
• 12:09
  strcat[m]
  yekip: the Auditor app uses hardware-based attestation, it doesn't rely on software checks to verify the OS but rather verified boot, attestation and hardware-backed keys in the HSM (Titan M on a Pixel 3)
• 13:43
  alzxjm[m]
  This is probably something of a novice question, but I'm wondering if the Pixelbook would be a potential target for GrapheneOS. I know Daniel has said in the past that laptops are not worthy targets, but the PB has Google's Titan M implementation and verified boot. Presumably the Pixelbook Go, as well. Would this qualify the device for further research?
• 13:43
  strcat[m]
  it doesn't have a Titan M, it's a different thing
• 13:47
  alzxjm[m]
  > it doesn't have a Titan M, it's a different thing

• #grapheneos
• 19:20
  TheJollyRoger
  TLDR: to discourage legal or extralegal insider access attacks, the Titan M hardware security module installed in your phone will not allow the phone's firmware to be updated until you authenticate to it using the user's passcode.
• 19:21
  strcat[m]
  specifically the Titan M firmware

• #grapheneos
• 13:48
  anupritaisno1[m]
  What exactly is a titan M
• 13:51
  fll[m]
  anupritaisno1: blog.google/products/pixel/titan-m-…s-pixel-3-our-most-secure-phone-yet
• 14:03
  jiibus[m]
  Honest question, how do we know the Titan M doesn't have anything malicious going on?
• 14:05
  renlord
  jiibus[m]: open titan project
• 14:06
  hitchhooker[m]
  Is Titan M related to opentitan?
• 14:08
  strcat[m]
  anupritaisno1: the Titan M would not be useful if it didn't have firmware signing
• 14:09
  anupritaisno1[m]
  For the titan m
• 14:09
  strcat[m]
  anupritaisno1: have another security chip that secures the Titan M?
• 14:10
  strcat[m]
  the AVB key is flashed to the Titan M
• 14:13
  strcat[m]
  anupritaisno1: on the Pixel 3, the bootloader retrieves the key from the Titan M (in addition to whatever SoC enforcement there is)
• 14:14
  strcat[m]
  that stores the key on the Titan M
• 14:14
  strcat[m]
  the Titan M tracks bootloader lock state and is the main thing responsible for verified boot state storage for the OS

• #grapheneos
• 08:08
  galyoninion[m]
  I heard security chip called Titan-M is important
• 08:08
  aeonsolution[m]
  it should be the Titan M
• 08:10
  galyoninion[m]
  But I don't know which Pixel 3a has Titan M or not.
• 08:12
  aeonsolution[m]
  where did you hear that the pixel 3 line doesnt have the titan m
• 08:14
  stuux[m]
  the pixel 3a has the titan m
• 08:14
  cn3m[m]
  The Pixel 2 was the last device before Titan M

• #grapheneos
• 09:46
  renlord
  Titan M is the security chip on your pixel phone
• 20:44
  strcat[m]
  TheJollyRoger: and erase works reliably because Weaver tokens (provided by Titan M on Pixels) can be reliably erased on the security chip
• 20:47
  strcat[m]
  TheJollyRoger: Pixels add in the Weaver feature (which other devices can also provide) via the Titan M
• 20:57
  cn3m[m]
  TheJollyRoger: I'm talking about the Titan keys you can buy
• 20:59
  strcat[m]
  this is open source only in the sense than Qualcomm's TEE / SPU or Google's Titan M are open source
• 21:28
  strcat[m]
  the SoC (via TEE) and the Titan M are paired
• 22:13
  strcat[m]
  on Pixel 3 it's on the Titan M
• 22:16
  strcat[m]
  anupritaisno1: FRP data on pixels is on the Titan M

• #grapheneos
• 16:52
  dazinism
  alexbakker.me/post/mysterious-google-titan-m-bug-cve-2019-9465.html

• #grapheneos
• 08:38
  highupper[m]
  <fujita_[m] "its on grapeheneOS's github/ web"> Well he mainly talks about IOMMU in the FAQ page, but I'm looking for more specific stuff like Titan M requirements etc.
• 22:27
  TheJollyRoger
  This is by design; the Titan M will only allow upgrades, but it won't allow you to downgrade to an earlier version, to prevent a rollback attack.

• #grapheneos
• 20:34
  inquiree
  madaidan, cn3m: old.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/e…ing_guide_for_normal_people/fdmxqau. You see that bit about the titan M? It's a point he loves to tout. We should probably address that
• 22:08
  madaidan[m]
  He likes to say Huawei phones are the best and Pixels are the worst because of the dreaded Titan M black box. It's crazy.

• #grapheneos
• 07:07
  Arhu
  I don't follow. If they don't like custom verified boot, it's super easy for them to disable it on their Pixel phones. You're staying they just don't do that because it's not stock Qualcomm? Their Titan M chip isn't - that's already a divergence from Qualcomm

• #grapheneos
• 11:14
  dazinism
  Also the Pixel 3 onwards has the Titan M security chip that gives significant advantages

• #grapheneos
• 07:51
  strcat[m]
  hiya: there is the Titan M
• 07:51
  cyredanthem[m]
  Titan M

• #grapheneos
• 20:19
  strcat[m]
  i.e. the Titan M
• 20:20
  strcat[m]
  it's similar but probably doesn't have insider attack protection like the Pixel's Titan M - dunno

• #grapheneos
• 22:09
  TheJollyRoger
  The Titan M won't allow the firmware to be updated /unless/ it recieves the password.
• 22:20
  miniblue[m]
  I have a six digit pincode but will probably eventually shift to some some sort of passphrase if it's better from a security perspective. But you know, Titan M and all.